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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ENGINEERING COMMISSION, D. H. WHITTENBURG,
Chairman; H. J. CORLEISSEN
and
LAYTON
MAXFIELD,
Members of the Engineering
Commission,
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vs.

7867

BURTON F. PEEK and CHARLES
D. WIMAN, Trustees under the
Will and of the Estate of
CHARLES H. DEERE, Deceased,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' "Statement of Facts" contains so
many extraneous matters that it is unsatisfactory as
a basis for a discussion of the legal questions involved. We are not here concerned with the ownerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ship, area or state of improvement of properties or
tracts owned by other persons. This case involves
only certain land which belonged to appellants and,
in view of the award by this court of an extraordinary writ requiring the payment to appellants of
the damages fixed by the jury, the sole and only
question with which we are now concerned is
whether, under the law, appellants are entitled to a
new trial in an effort to obtain greater damages
than fixed by the jury, all other defenses being expressly waived by the filing by appellants of the
receipt for the money already awarded.
The property condemned, described in plaintiff's complaint as Parcel 28, is in one body, every
area of which, for whatever the same was or is suitable, is contiguous to some other area within the
boundaries of said parcel. It is true that running
through said parcel is State Highway 65, which furnishes ingress and egress to and from Emigration Canyon, a county road known as Kennedy Drive, and
certain drives laid out by appellants within that area
of Parcel 28 most suitable for residential purposes;
but none of these roads or drives constituted any obstruction tq passing from one part of the premises
to another. The location .of these roads was not regarded as important in appellants' division of the
property into six parcels as shown on the map, made
part of their application to sever, to which reference
will hereafter be made. Furthermore, the best evidence· that Parcel 28 is one parcel, and so regarded
by the appellants themselves, is that the drives laid
out or improved with surfacing or curb and gutter,
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were so designed and located by appellants as to
serve so much of the tract as was suitable for homes
(approximately 50 acres being so mountainou·s as
to be considered waste land), and the water -distributing system, supplied from tanks located on the upper, or waste land, area, the telephone conduits, gas
mains and electric lines were all likewise constructed
to serve the property as a unit. It is also to be noted
that the entire area of said Parcel 28 was vacant and
unoccupied and was outside the limits of Salt Lake
City. A small area of about seven acres had been
platted as a county subdivision under Chapter 50,
Title 78, Utah Code Annotated 1943, whereby the
fee to the drives or streets laid out therein became
vested in Salt Lake County, (Sec. 78-5-4).
Except for the contention of appellants that they
were prejudiced by the court's order in making a division of Parcel 28 for the purpose of assessing values, it would be unnecessary to make reference to the
"Motion to Sever" (R. 51) filed by appellants in
the trial court, whereby they sought to have the court
order that the area sought to be condemned be divided into six parcels as described in the affidavit of
Dean F. Brayton and as exhibited by the map attached to said affidavit (R. 44, 47). In his affidavit,
Mr. Brayton avers that in his opinion
"It will simplify the trial of said cause and
the convenience of the parties to try separately
the issues as to the values of the land comprising each of said parcels. Failure to so segregate
and sever will, in affiant's opinion, tend to confuse the issues and result in an inordinately long
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trial with attendant burden upon court person ..
nel and the parties." (R. 46.)
Respondent contended that Parcel 28 is but one
parceL but the court, in his discretion, while refus ..
ing to permit a trial as to each, entered an order di ..
viding said parcel into tw-o parcels, each to be sep ..
ara tel y assessed by one jury. Each parcel was so
assessed and the jury found an aggregate value as
of July 12, 1951, of $495,875.00, to which was
added $111.40 costs, making a total of $495,986.40
for which judgment was entered, and that amount
was paid into court for appellants within the time
fixed by statute.
Appellants then moved the court to amend the
judgment by adding thereto interest at the legal rate
from July 12, 1951, until payment of the judgment
should be made (R. 127), which motion was denied.
Then, after the judgment of condemnation was entered whereby respondent became entitled to possession of the property upon payment of the award, appellants filed their "Application For Payment"
wherein they prayed that the court order
"the money so paid into court to be delivered
to applicants upon filing a receipt therefor; such
payment to be held to be an abdonment by such
applicants of all defenses interposed by them
excepting their claim for greate·r compensation,

to wit, for interest on the sum of $495~875.00
from July 12, 1951, until date of payment."

(R. 140.)

(Italics ours.)

When this application was presented, the court
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stated that he would not make the order applied for
and thus leave open for litigation only the question
of interest,-the only additional compensation claimed
by appellants,- (the court having already denied the
application to amend the judgment so as to award
such interest), and His Honor three times, requested
counsel for appellants to elect whether he desired an
order in accordance with the statute that payment be
made upon satisfaction of the judgment or upon appellants' filing a receipt abandoning all defenses except their claim for greater compensation. Counsel
three times refused to make any such election and
thereupon the court ordered the money to be paid
on satisfaction of judgment. (See affidavit of Judge
Van Cott in Peek et al. v. State of Utah, included in
the Record in this case by special order of this court
December 31, 1952.) The appeal is "from the judgment for damages in the sum of $495,986.40, including costs, entered in the above action on the 1Oth
day of May, 1952, and the 15th day of May, 1952,
and from the final judgment of condemnation entered
herein on the 27th day of May, 1952." (R. 146.)
With these facts in mind, does the record show
any prejudicial error committed by the trial court
which entitles appellants to a new trial?

ARGUMENT
While some other points are set forth in their
"Statement of Points" (R. 14 7-148), the only points
appellants argue in their brief are that the court erred:
1.

In refusing to allow interest from July 12,
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1951, the date of the service of summons.
Br. 9.)

(App.

2. -In refusing to permit appellants to cross examine plaintiff's expert witness, Edward M. Ashton,
as to market value of comparable property as of July
12, 19 51, including specifically the price paid for Indian Village, and in excluding evidence of such values.
(App. Br. 9-10.)
3. In refusing to permit a separate valuation
of the water system.
4. In ruling that the land sought to be condemned consisted of but two parcels.
5. In eliminating the issue of severance damages. (App. Br. 10.) Let us consider these assignments in their order.

Interest From Date of Service of Summons Not
Allowdble
As we understand appellants' argument, it is that
they are entitled to interest from the date of service
of summons because the property here involved was
Htaken" by the State by virtue of the passage of the
Act (Laws, First Special Session, 19 51, page 17), by
which the Engineering Commission was ''authorized
and directed to forthwith condemn." This contention is without merit. In City of Norwalk v. Norwalk Investment Company (Conn.), 110 A. 557,
the statute provided:
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"Said bridge and park are hereby declared
to be a public use and necessity, * * * and the
said park is hereby established and laid out with
the boundaries herein described.''
and the City of Norwalk was, by the statute, authorized to condemn. The owner claimed interest
from the date of the passage of the Act, but it was
held that the Act did not constitute the "taking,"
and the claim of the owner was denied.
The said Act of our legislature became effective
June 18, 19 51. Therefore, if the passage of the Act
constituted a "taking," appellants, logical! y, should
claim interest from June 18, 19 51, instead of from
July 12, 19 51. However, it is scarcely worthwhile
to argue that the enactment of the statute was not a
"taking," for the Act provides that the Engineering
Commission shall "forthwith condemn," which, of
course, contemplated the usual judicial procedure in
"taking," that is, to establish the necessity for the
taking, to fix the value of the property and establish, by decree of condemnation, the State's right to
possession thereof upon payment of such value.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution which appellants quote in their Brief, gives
no guaranty that appellants shall receive interest, or
even any amount of damages or compensation. That
provision merely guarantees that the State shall provide a proper procedure whereby compensation shall
be fixed. It has been repeatedly held that
''All that is essential is that in some appropriate way, before some properly constituted triSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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bunal, inquiry shall be made as to the amount of
compensation, and when this has been provided
there is that due process of law which is required by the federal constitution.''
A. Backus, Jr. ~ Sons v. Fort Street, etc. Company,
169 U. S. 557, 42 L. Ed. 853; Appleby v. Buffalo,
221 U.S. 524, 55 L. Ed. 838.

Appellants evidently did not consider their property had been taken either by the passage of the Act
or by the service of the summons for, on December 14,
19 51, they filed their ''Notice Re Motion For Immediate Occupancy" (Add. R. 60), calling up for disposition what they designated as plaintiffs HMotion
for Immediate Occupancy." As a matter of fact,
respondent had neither filed nor made any such motion; its only reference to occupancy being the second paragraph of the prayer of the complaint, to wit:
''That upon notice being given to the various defendants in the manner prescribed by law,
the plaintiff be given_ an order authorizing the
immediate occupancy of the designated premises
for the purpose of commencing such construction and improvement of a state park." (R. 19.)
Yet counsel state in their Brief:
"When defendants called up plaintiffs Mo . .
tion For Occupancy, plaintiff resisted its own
motion." (App. Br. 11.)
Respondent did resist an order of immediate oc . .
cupancy because it had made no motion therefor, and
no notice had been given to defendants that a request
would be made for any such order.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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As to whether compensation should include interest from the date of service of summons, we have
only to say that, unless this court determines that its
former decisions are erroneous, and should be overruled, there is no merit in appellants' contention. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company v. Jones, 29 Utah
147, 80 P. 732; San Pedro Railroad v. Boa·rd of Education, 35, Utah 13, 99 P. 263; Salt Lake etc. Railroad v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189·P. 90. See also
State v. Danielson et al., - Utah - , 247 P. (2d)
900.
California, with the same statute as Utah, has
declared the same rule as prevails here. (City of Los
Angeles v. Gager, 102 P. 17; City of Oakland v.
Wheeler, 168 P. 23.)
Appellants' contention that they should be allowed interest because their possession, after the service of summons, was ''worthless'' and their development operations interfered with, is answered by Judge
Straup in Oregon Short Line Railroad v. Jones, supra.
To quote:
"Under section 3599, appellants argue that
the right to compensation accrues and is due on
the date of the service of summons, and because
thereof, and because no improvements put upon
the property subsequent to that date· shall be included in the assessment of compensation or damages, there is, when the summons is served, such
an interference with the full enjoyment and ordinary benefits of the property by the owner,
and such an invasion of his rights thereto, as to
amount, in legal effect, in a taking, within the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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meaning of the Constitution providing that 'private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation.' And it
is claimed, as the property was taken on that
date, and as compensation therefor then became
due, appellants were entitled to interest thereon
from the date of the service of summons to verdict, less rents and other benefits of possession
received by them covering the same period. When
all the provisions and proceedings relating to the
eminent domain act for condemnation of property are considered we are persuaded that appellants' claim cannot prevail. In determining
this claim to interest, much depends upon when,
in the proceedings, the taking of the property
took place. While the law is most exacting that
private property shall not be taken without compensation, still the condemner is not required
to make that compensation until he does take,
either actual! y or constructive! y."

*

*

*

*

"Considering again our statute, it is quite
clear it excludes any claim to interest, at least
such as is here made. It says in plain terms that
the 'actual value at that date (service of summons) shall be the measure of compensation for
all property to be actual! y taken,' etc. ; that is,
the Legislature has said the actual value of the
land-no more or less-shall be the compensation to be assessed. Within thirty days after
final judgment plaintiff must 'pay the sum of
money assessed.' He can pay no less. The statute does not require him to pay more. He has
thirty days within which to make that payment.
To also .allow interest to be computed on the
verdict, the 'measure of compensation' is some-
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thing more and in addition to the 'actual value'
of the property at the date of service of summons.
When the statute says the actual value of the
land to be actually taken shall be the measure of
compensation, and that plaintiff shall have final
order of condemnation upon the payment of the
sum of money assessed, it has excluded all other
conditions. (San Fran. ~ S. J. V. Ry. Co. v.
Leviston, 134 Cal. 412, 66 Pac. 473.) To allow appellants' claim of interest to prevaiL we
are obliged to read something into the statute
not found there."
The case of Fell v. U. P. Railroad Company, 32
Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, cited by appellants, has no
application here. That was an action for injury to
livestock and the court held that
"The true test to be applied as to whether
interest should be allowed before judgment in a
given case or not, is, therefore, not whether the
damages are liquidated or otherwise, but whether
the injury and consequent damages a•re complete
* * *." (Italics ours.)
Here the damage was not complete until the question of necessity of taking the property for public use
had been determined (denied by appellants in this
case) and there can be no damage until there is a
"taking". Besides, this court has definite! y construed
the eminent domain statute.
Even if any such damage for any period prior
to possession, by way of interest or otherwise, were
recovable (which it is not), appellants would not
be entitled to any such damage without specific proof
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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thereof, and no such proof was offered, which of itself would prevent the recovery of interest. (Town
of Hingman v. U.S., 161 Fed. 295; U.S. v. Holden,
268 Fed. 223.)
It is also a fact that the long period which elapsed
after the service of summons and before verdict, for
which period appellants claim interest, was due, in
large part, to the ''Request For Admission'' (R. 48),
"Motion For Summary Judgment" (R. 49), "Motion to Sever" (R. 51), Pre-trial order of January 22,
1952 (see paragraph 5 thereof, R. 52, 56), "Notice
of Motion Re Immediate Occupancy'' (Add. R. 60),
"Motion For Further Hearing and Supplemental Affidavit of Dean F. Brayton" (R. 79, 68), and other
dilatory proceedings by appellants themselves.
In Brown v. U.S., 263 U.S. 78, 68 L. Ed. 17L
the court did approve the allowance of interest from
the date of service of summons until the payment of
the jury's award, but-the decision is not based- upon
any constitutional right of the owner to receive such
interest, but purely upon the basis of the construction
of the Idaho statute by the Federal Court for Idaho,
to the effect that the date of the service of summons
was the date of the "taking" and the Supreme Court
declared it to be its policy to follow the construction
given the statute by the court of the jurisdiction wherein the case arose. Says the court:
"It is better, when possible, to act in harmony rather than in conflict with the established
policy of a state."
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In U. S. v. Rogers, 255 U. S. 163, 65 L. Ed.
566, the United States brought an action in the United
States Court for New Mexico to condemn lands for
reclamation purposes. The court calls attention to
the conformity act which in effect provides that practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings arising under
that act shall conform to the practice of the state in
which the action is brought. In due course the award
of compensation was made and the owners of the
land subsequently made a motion for a supplemental
order requiring the government to deposit additional
money equal to six per cent interest calculated from
the time that the lands were taken by flooding, and
the court made that order. The Supreme Court comments:
"It appears that the allowance of interest
was from the time of the actual taking of the
land to the time deposit was made in payment
for the same. * * *
"It is unquestionably true that the United
States upon claims made against it cannot, in
the absence of a statute to that end, be subjected
to the payment of interest (citing cases). The
government was seeking for purposes authorized
by statute to appropriate the lands, and it had
actually taken them, and had deprived the owners of all beneficial use thereof from the date
from which the allowance of interest ran.
"Having taken the lands of the defendant
in error, it was the duty of the government to
make just compensation as of the time when the
owners were deprived of their property (citing
authority).
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"In fixing the compensation the d.istrict
court and the Circuit Court of Appeals tn affirming the judgment followed the ~ew Mexico
statute fixing the rate of in.terest at stx per ce.nt.
This was in conformity wtth the former ruhng
of the Circuit Court of Appeals applying the
statute of Minnesota to lands appropriated in
that state. U. S. v. Sargent, 89 CCA 81, 1~2
F. 81.
'.'The government urges that the conformity act of August 1, 18 8 8, does not require the
United States government to be bound by the
rule of the state statute in the allowance of interest. This may be true, but we agree with
the courts below that the allowance of just compensation by giving interest from the time of
taking until payment is a convenient and fair
method of ascertaining the sum to which the
owner of the land is entitled. The fact that
the rule is in harmony with the policy of the
state where the lands are situated does not militate against, but makes for the justice and propriety of its adoption. U. S. v. Sargent, supra."
So far as we are aware, the Supreme Court of
the United States has never disapproved of the foregoing pronouncement.
The trial court did not err in refusing to amend
the judgment to include interest from July 12, 1951,
or refusing to order payment of the jury's award upon
the filing by appellants of a receipt abandoning all
defenses except their claim for such interest, which,
by their application, they declared to be the only additional compensation to which they were entitled.
So much for the question of interest.
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Evidence of Sale Price of Other P·ronert11. or of
Residential Lots Within Area Adjacent to Land
Condemned, Inadmissible
The only portions of the Record which have to
do with this question are hereafter set forth. Edward
M. Ashton established, without question or objection,
his qualifications as an expert on real estate values
(Add. R. 2 9, 3 1 ) , and he testified as to the value of
the property in question. At the conclusion of his
cross examination (Add. R. 40) the following colloquy, between the court and counsel, occurred:
''Mr. Behle: I assume, for the record, I
am foreclosed in testing this witness in respect
to comparative values on any basis; front foot,,
acreage, per lot, as well as asking him in regard
to his subdivision?
"The Court: Well, you may, unless there
is objection, proceed the same with him as you
did with Mr. Kiepe. Is that what you mean?
''Mr. Behle: Well, I thought the rulings
cut me off from any of that, so I wanted to be
sure. In other words, I understand I can't ask
the witness what land in the vicinity comparable
to this land sells for, either by an acre basis or
a fran t foot basis, or a lot basis, is that correct?
''The Court: Well, yes. I ruled against
you on that with Mr. Kiepe and I would do the
same with Mr. Ashton.
''Mr. Behle: Yes, sure. In other words,
I can't test on comparative sales, on comparative
sales prices?
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"The Court: That is correct.
not." (Add. R. 40, 41.)
~'Mr.

*

*

*

You can-

*

Behle: If the Court please, I think
the record is clear on our proffer of proof of comparable values. I think the door has been closed
on us every time we have tried to prove and test
values, and here is a specific instance.
~'The Court:
Well, the only reason that
the door is closed to you is that the law provides that you shall not do that and I try to
follow what the law is. I am not trying to close
any door on you and if you have any doubt
about it I can show you the authorities on the
value of a place. Well, that case Mr. Budge had
the other day covers that subject. It has not
been permitted and you persist in it and it is
against the law.
"Mr. Behle: Well, of course, that is one
of the arguments we have been having right
along.
"T.he Court: Well, that is right. Of
course, I have been ruling against you because
I have been ruling it is not lawful for you to
divide this property into lots, nor the price per
lot, or any other property into lots or the values
of them.
"Mr. Behle: But by the same token we
have been absolutely foreclosed from testing these
witnesses, opinions on the basis of comparable
values in the area.
"The Court: No, you haven't been fore . .
closed, but you have been permitted to ask him
to consider what those values are in the compa . .
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rable values in the area. You haven't been foreclosed.'! (Add. R. 42-43.) (Italics ours.)

*

*

*

*

"Mr. Behle: We also specifically tender
proof with respect to Indian Village as a comparable subdivision purchased on an acreage basis
as raw acreage and the value per acre of
$7,500.00 shortly before the date of condemnation and the characteristics of that area as being
comparable.
''Mr. Budge: Same objection.
''The Court: The objection is sustained.
"Mr. Behle: For the record only we again
make a tender in connection with lot sales and
prtces.
"Mr. Budge: Same objection.
"The Court:
demned?

Within the area being con-

''Mr. Behle:
rable to the area.

Within the area and compa-

"Mr. Budge:
''The Court:
(Add. R. 52.)

Same objection.
The objection is sustained.'

t

In their Brief, appellants state:
"It will also be readily remembered that a
large portion of the Deere Estate lands consisted
of subdivided residential lots, more than 20 of
which had been sold to individual purchasers
on the open market, to other defendants in the
condemnation proceeding. Yet th'e court below
absolutely excluded direct evidenec or cross exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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amination as to lot or acreage values of property comparabl'e to either the lots or acreage of
the Deere Estate.'' (Italics ours.) (Appellants'
Brief, 24, 25.)

*

*

*

*

"We would have thought it clear that the
best evidence of market value of land, or for that
matter almost any tangible property with a market value, would be the actual figures as to which
that or comparable property was selling for on
the open market at about the time of the valuation." (Appellants' Bri~f 26.)
It is quite apparent from these statements that
counsel's position at the trial was, and is now, that
evidence of the value of other property should have
been received, not for the purpose of testing the quali . .
fication of the witness Ashton, for, as before stated,
his qualification was never questioned, but as substantive proof of the value of the land condemned. As to
Indian Village, a subdivision, witness Ashton made
it quite clear that the land within that project was
not similar to the Deere Estate property. He testified
that Indian Village "is not so hilly. It is more flat
and right in the midst €>f development that is surrounding, that is pretty high! y developed.'' (Add.
R. 42.) So, even if evidence of value of comparable
property woulq have been admissible (which we do
not concede), Indian Village was not comparable
either in location or character and the court did not
err in refusing to permit the following question to be
answered:
"How much did you or your associates pay
per acre for that raw land?" (Add. R. 42.)
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There vvas no offer to show that any acreage
(other than appellants claim with respect to Indian
Village) was comparable to the Deere Estate property,
or to show the value of any other acreage. Neither
did the court err in rejecting appellants' offer of proof of the sale price of Indian Village (Add. R. 52) .
(a) Value of Other Property

In Maxwell v. Highway Com. (Ia.) 271 N.
883 the court declares:

w.·

"Appellants also contend that the court
erred in admitting the testimony of the witness,
Joe Stratton, as to the sale price of other farms
in a nearby community shortly prior to the condemnation of the land in question. These witnesses testified over proper objection as to the
sale price of such other lands. The rule with
reference to the admissibility of this kind of testimony seems to have been in some conflict until
the decision in the case of Watkins v. Wabash
Railroad Co., 137 Iowa, 441, 113 N. W. 924.
In that case many authorities upon this question were reviev1ed and a further discussion of
the reasons of the rule there announced is deemed
unnecessary here.
"In that case this court said, 13 7 Iowa,
441, loc. cit. 442, 113 N. W. 924, 925: 'It is
to be conceded that under some circumstances
testimony of this kind is admissible to show the
knowledge of the witness and his competency to
speak as an expert upon the subject concerning
which he is being examined. This is especially
true where the witness has assumed to express an
opinion, and is being cross-examined for the purSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pose of testing the weight and value of his testimony. King v. Iowa Midland Railroad Co.,
34 Iowa, 458; Winklemans v. Des Moines N. W.
Railroad Co., 62 Iowa, 11, 17 N. W. 82; Cummins v. Des Moines ~ St. L. Railroad Co., 63
Iowa, 397, 19 N. W. 268; Hollingsworth v.
Des Moines~ St. L. Railroad Co., 63 Iowa, 443,
19 N. W. 325. But the practically universal
rule is to the effect that such testimony is not
admissible as substantive evidence of the value
of the property which is the subject of the controversy. That the offer of the testimony * * *
was not intended simply to show the qualification of the witn'ess to give an opinion of the
value of plaintiff, s land can hardly be disputed
from the record. * * * The witness had already
s.hown his qualification by testifying to h'is ownership of land in that vicinity, and to his familiarity with land values in the neighborhood.
Having th.us shown his qualification, he had
been allowed to give his testimony without objection. Thereafter, and apparently for no other
reason than to corroborate his estimate and give
it additional strength and influence with the
jury, he was allowed to state t.hat * * * after
th'e condemnation proceedings * * * he had sold
his own land at $60 per acre. In this we think
there was prejudicial et"ror.', (Italics ours.)
The statement we have italicized is especially applicable here, for it appears from the record and· from appellants' Brief, that the proffer of proof of comparative values of acreages (limited in this case to Indian
Village) was for the purpose only of proving the
value of the Deere Estate.
In City of Los Angeles v. Deacon (Cal.), 7 P.
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(2d) 3 78, the court, after stating that the question
in eminent domain is, what is the market value of the
property being condemned, states:
"In arriving at an answer to this question
for himself, a person of ordinary business judgment would want to know the answer to anumber of preliminary inquiries. It is just possible
he would want to know at what figure the property was assessed by the county assessor. He
might find it of interest to know what value was
put upon it by the appraisers when it was re . .
cently involved in a probate proceeding. He
certainly would be interested, if it was the market value he sought to determine, in any offers
that had been made for the property, and in the
price at which it and property similarly situated
had recently been sold. He would, most likely,
be interested in the amount of profit that had
been made in the use to which the property had
been put.
"But conceding that all these facts would
be taken into consideration by one endeavoring
to determine the market value of a piece of property, it is nevertheless the settled law of this state
that none of them may be proven for the put;pose of establishing the market value. The pro . .
cedure which is recognized as proper is, for the
witness when found to be qualified to give an
opinion as an expert, to state, first, ~hat is, in
his judgment, the market value of the property.
(Citing authority.) On this, the examination
in chief, it may not be shown: For what sum
the property was assessed (citing authority); nor
the value placed upon it by the appraisers in a
probate proceeding (citing cases) ;· nor the price
offered for the property being condemned (citing
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cases) ; nor yet that offered or paid for lands in
the neighborhood (Spring Valley Water-Works
v. Drinkhouse (1891) 92 Cal. 528, 28 P. 681;
City of San Luis Obispo v. Brizzolara ( 1893)
100 Cal. 434, 34 P. 1083; In re Estate of Ross
( 1915) 171 Cal. 64, 151 P. 113 8; City of Los
Angeles v. Hughes (1927) 202 Cal. 731, 262
P. 73 7; Reclamation Dist. No. 730 v. lnglin
(1916) 31 Cal. App. 495, 160 P. 1098; Palladine v. Imperial Valley F. L. Ass'n (1924) 65
Cal. App. 727, 225 P. 291; ·Dickey v. Dunn
( 1927) 80 Cal. App. 724, 252 P. 770; Fishel
v. F. M. Ball~ Co., Inc. (1927) 83 Cal. App.
128, 256 P. 493; Merchants' Trust Co. v. Hopkins, supra; and see leading case of Central Pac.
R. R. Co. v. Pearson, supra). 'He should not be
asked regarding specific facts in the examination
in chief.' De Freitas v. Town of Suisun City,
supra. On cross-examination, however, questions may be asked about these various matters:
* * * prices offered and paid for other properties (citing authorities). When evidence of sales,
etc., is received on cross-examination, however,
it is solely for the purpose of testing the value
of the witnesses' testimony; it is not in itself
evidence of value of the property. (Citing cases.)
Nor is the rule any different on redirect examination than it is on the opening examination in
chief, even though some specific sales may have
been gone into during the cross-examination.
Reclamation Dist. No. 730 v. lnglin, supra."
In Chicago, etc. Co. v. Muller, (Kan.) 25 P.
21 0, the following is from the opinion:
"In the cross-examination of the plaintiff,
the question was asked as to what sales had been
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made in the neighborhood, upon which he based
his judgment as to values, and, without being
asked, he volunteered this statement: 'A neighbor of mine right north of me has one hundred
and twenty acres, and was offered six thousand
dollars.' The defendant in error moved that
this statement of the witness be stricken out.
The request was denied, and a proper exception
made. This, we think, was error, and the court
should hav~ withdrawn the statement from the
. ''
Jury.
See also:
Stinson v. R. R.
Helena etc. Co. v.
Portland etc. Co.
Portland etc. Co.
P. 1192.

Co. (Minn.), 6 N. W. 784.
McLean (Mont.), 99 P. 1061.
v. Penny (Ore.), 158 P. 404.
v. Ladd Est. Co. (Ore.), 155
-

This court, in Telluride P. Co. v. Bruneau, 41
P. 4, 125 P. 399, did not hold, as appellants claim
(App. Br. 27), that evidence of comparative values
is admissible. It holds that it was not prejudicial
error to excl.ude such evidence on direct examination.
It is not, therefore, likely that the court will now hold
it to be error to exclude such evidence on cross-examination when it is not offered to test the qualification
of the witness.
(b) Value of Subdivision Lots
#'-

The following offer by appellants was refused:
"Mr. Behle: For the record only we again
make a tender in connection with lot sales and
prices.'' (Add. R. 52.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

Concerning this ruling, appellants state:
Hit will also be readily remembered that a
large portion of the Deere Estate lands consisted
of subdivided residential lots, more than twenty
of which had been sold to individual purchasers
on the open market to other ·defendants in the
condemnation proceeding. Yet the court below
absolutely excluded dire~t evidence or cross examination as to lot or acreage values of property
comparable to either the lots or acreage of the
Deere Estate." (App. Br. 24-25.)
It is likewise not permissible to introduce evidence of the sales price of subdivision or other lots
in the vicinity of the property to be condemned.
In City of Los Angeles v. H.ughes (Cal.), 262
P. 737, it is said:
"A number of times during the trial the
court asked questions as to whether the subdivision possibilities had been taken into consideration by the witness in arriving at his estimate
of the market value and was assured that this
had been done. The court also personally viewed
the land and had an opportunity to see its character as well as the development of the surrounding property.
"If the argument of counsel for these appellants is intended to go one step further, and
it is sought to establish that the value of the
land must be estimated not only on the basis
of what the owners would be able to obtain for
lots after subdivision had actually taken place
(and the argument is open to that interpret~
tion), we are unable to agree, nor do the cases
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25

relied upon by these appellants support this contention.''
The court then quotes with approval certain authorities giving the correct rule for the determination
of the value of the land sought to· be condemned, and
then observes:
''Under all of the authorities, both in this
state and elsewhere, the true basis for computing
the market value of land sought to be condemned,
in view of evidence of its suitability for subdivision purposes, is its value as it stood on the
date when, under the law, its value was to be
determined, plus any increased value which it
may have had on the market by reason of its
suitability for subdivision into city lots.
''During the trial a witness was asked:
'Q. Now you have a list of any sales made
there that your figures are based on?' Objection was made to this evidence on direct examination of any specific sales, but the court stated
that Mr. Smith 'could tell what he knows about
sales out there.' This the witness proceeded to
do. The ruling was erroneous and objection
should have been sustained."
In 18 Am. Jur., p. 881, the general rule is stated
as follows:

"* * * For example, when a tract taken by
eminent domain is used as a farm, the owner is
entitled to have its possible value for building
purposes considered; but the jury or other tribunal is not to determine how it could best be
divided into building lots, nor conjecture how
fast they could be sold, nor at what price per
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lot. As a rule, projects of the owner in regard
to the land are too remote and speculative.

* * *"

In Nichols on Eminent Domain, 2d ed. at page
1170, it is stated:
~~The

owner cannot, for example, introduce evidence of the return that he would derive
from cutting up a vacant tract of land into building lots, since this would involve pure conjecture as to how fast the lots would be sold and
the price that each would bring; and the details of the possible improvement of the land,
and its value, or the expected profits, or rentals
after such improvement was completed, are equally inadmissible, for the same reason. The trial
court cannot be too careful in excluding evidence
of this character. * * *"
In Pennsylvania S. V. R. Co. v. Cleary, 123 Pa.
442 ( 1889), 17 Atl. 468, the court considered the
value of a tract of land which was being condemned
and for which the owner claimed damage on the basis
of individual building lots. The court stated:

"* * * It is proper to inquire what the
tract is worth, having in view the purposes for
which it is best adapted; but it is the tract, and
not the lots into which it might be divided, that
is to be valued. * * *

*

*

*

*

~'We

do not agree with the learned judge
that there was any such question for the jury
in this case. The jury are to value the tract of
land and that only. They are not to determine
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how it could best be divided into building lots,
nor to conjecture how fast they could be sold,
nor at what price per lot. A speculator or investor, in deciding what price he could afford
to pay, would consider the chances and probabilities of the situation as then actually existing. A jury should do the same thing. They
are not to inquire what a speculator might be
able to realize out of a resale in the future, but
what a present purchaser would be willing to
pay for it in the condition it is now in. This
is a rule that is well settled, and the court should
have drawn the attention of the jury to it, so as
to have left no room for uncertainty on their
part. They should have been told that they had
nothing to do with the subdivision of this tract,
the price of the lots, or the probability of their
sale; but that they were to ascertain the fair selling value of the land before and after the entry
by the railroad company, in order to determine
the actual damage done to its owner.''
In the case of James L. Thornton v. City of
Birmingham, 250 Ala. 651 (1940), 35 So. (2d)
545, the court held generally that while the value
of property for subdivision purposes may be considered in the condemnation procedings in ascertaining its fair market value, it is not permissible to show
the prospective selling price of individual lots. The
court stated:
''An analogous principle also condemns the
effort of the appellant to introduce a tentative
plan of a subdivision of the property, showing
the prospective selling price of the individual
lots therein. Evidence of value of the property
for any use to which it is raesonably adapted is,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

as already stated, admissible, but the proof must
be so limited and the testimony restricted to its
value for such purpose. Of probative tendency
on this issue is the offer of a proposed plan or
a possible scheme of development, and the trial
court so held, but it was not permissible to incorporate in such a plan the speculative price
of the individual lots."
In accord with the foregoing authorities, it clearly appears that witness Ashton based his values of
the two parcels upon a consideration of the location
and character thereof, with due regard to the topography and to the highest possible use for which each
parcel was suitable. He had laid out fifty subdivisions in and about Salt Lake City. He had been familiar with the Deere Estate property for 40 years
and recently had made a thorough examination of it.
He was familiar with the improvements on each parcel and it- was upon the basis of all these facts that
his valuation was based (Add. R. 31-3 7). The court
was right in excluding evidence of the price received
for separate lots in the vicinity of the residential area
of the Deere Estate property.
Evidence of Separate Value of Water Right and
Water System, Inadmissible,

Appellants complain that the court rejected evidence of the separate value of the water right and
water system. The following is shown by the record:
''Mr. Behle: If the Court please, if we
had been permitted through the witness, Ullrich,
we would have p:t'oved that the water right was
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worth $10,500.00 and the distribution system
$63,700.00; of which $25,700.00 was allocated
to the distribution syste·m within Parcel 1, the
balance being the collecting works and reservoirs
and the transmission lines. These are fair market values as of July 15, 19 51.
"We also make a tender of proof from Mr.
Ray Christensen, the City Attorney of Salt Lake
City, that such distribution systems-and I am
speaking of that part within Parcel 1-have an
independent value of their own and that in the
event of annexation it is usual for the City to
acquire that system as a part of its own water
system, depending, of course, on the individual
circumstances, and that it does comply with specifications and upon determining its value.
"Mr. Budge: Well, of course, we object
to that proof upon the ground that it is improper and incompetent and that the land has
been already valued with the improvements
thereon included, and for the further reason that
there has been no proof of ownership of water,
no evidence of ownership, and therefore that any
evidence of value would be incompetent and no
evidence particularly of any quantity of water
that was owned or that there is any ownership
of any water. It would be impossible to have
any value fixed without having first established
the quantity of water that was owned and used,
and there is no evidence at all of that, of the
area.'' (Add. R. 16.)
The objection was well taken upon all grounds
stated. At the time of the offer no evidence had been
introduced of ownership of any water right and none
now appears in the record before t.h-is court. However,
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it will be observed from appellants' brief that their
objection to the court's ruling is, that separate value
was proper not only because the water system was
designed to serve the Deere Estate propertyt but because of its value for "ultimate use elsewhere after
1952, when Oak Hills was to be connected with Salt
Lake City municipal water system" (App. Br. 2829). Oak Hills was nott on July 12, 19 51, the date
as of which value was to be determinedt within Salt
Lake City and no application for its annexation had
been filed. When would it become a city subdivision? When would it be connected with the municipal water system? Where or for what purpose
could the water right and system be ultimately used
elsewhere than on Oak Hills, or to whom could it be
sold for such ultimate use? The most that counsel
claimed was that
"the distribution systems * * * have an independent value of their own and that in the event
of annexation it is usual for the city to acquire
that system as part of its own water system,
depending, of course, on the individual circumstances, and that it does comply with specifications and upon determining its value" (Add. R.
16.) (Italics ours.)
Appellants offered to show a separate present
value based on all manner of conjectures as to what
might or might not occur in the future; without any
proof that the system complied with city specifications
and based upon a future determination of value. It
is quite apparent that the court prope,rly denied such
offer of proof. The ruling of _the court was proper
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for the futher reason that the water right (if there
was a water right) was appurtenant to the land and
the water system an "improvement". The statute,
Section 104-6-1, provides that the jury must ascertain and assess
"The value of the property condemned and all
improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, ,' etc.
The California statute is identical with our own,
and in Vallejo v. Home Savings Bank, 140 Pac. 974,
it is said:
''Appellants sought by the same witness to
show the market value of the improvements as
separate from the realty; but the court held 'that
the testimony must go to the market value of
the property as a whole.' Complaint is made of
this ruling, but it was strictly in accordance with
the course prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 1248, subd. 1, as follows: 'The
court, jury or referee * * * must ascertain and
assess: ( 1) the value of the property sought to
be condemned, and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate or interest therein; if it consists of
different parcels, the value of each parcel and each
estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed.' It thus expressly appears that separate
assessments are to be made when there are different parcels of land, and, under the familiar rule
of construction, the present case is excluded by
implication.''

In Los Angeles v. Klinker (Cal.), 25 P. (2d)
826, the court quotes with approval the following
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from the New York case of Banner Milling Co. v.
State, 148 N. E. 668, 672:
" 'T,he claimant is entitled to recover the
value of its physical property as it existed at the
time of the appropriation. That does not mean
that its value is t.o be arrived at by taking the
value of the various elements and items making
up the property separately, and considering them
without reference to each other, and then adding
together these sums. The claimant is entitled to
compensation, not merely for so much land, so
much brick, lumber, materials, and machinery,
considered separately; but, if they have been combined, adjusted, synchronized, and perfected into
an efficient functioning unit of property, then
it must be paid for that unit, so combined, adjusted, synchronized, and perfected, as it existed at the moment of appropriation. In that
limited sense, it is entitled to the 'going value'if such a term is permissible-of its physical
property. In fixing the amount of award we will
be guided by that principle.' "
See also Dept. of Public Works v. Hubbard (Ill.)
1 N. E. (2d) 383.
No Error in Dividing Parcel 28 Into Only Two
Parcels for Trial

The records of this court will show that appellants on or about April 1, 19 52, applied for an intermediate appeal from the trial court's order dividing
Parcel 28, -as described in the complaint, into two
parcels for the purposes of the trial and such application was denied. Whether or not this decision was
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tantamount to an approval of the trial court's order,
or is res judicata of that question, it is nevertheless
true that the trial court committed no error. As a
matter of fact, Parcel 28 was, and is, only one parcel.
It was in one ownership. It consists of one body of
unoccupied land regarded by appellants themselves as
a unit when they installed the water system, drives
and other improvements to serve so much of the area
as was usable. However, we made no objection to
the segregation made by the court.
The authorities cited by appellants are mostly
quotations from text~, but, in general, are not against
our contention under the facts in this case.
How unwise and expensive it would have been
for the court to order a division into six parcels as
arbitrarily marked off on a plat exhibited by appellants. And appellants insisted upon a separate trial
as to each parcel. Such procedure would have made
it necessary to rehash all of the evidence at each trial
and there would, of course, have been six verdicts and
six judgments, with the possibility of six appeals.
How would such procedure contribute to avoiding
"an inordinately long trial with attendant burden
upon court personnel and parties" as claimed by Mr.
Brayton in his affidavit (R. 46)?
We always conceded that it was not only permissible, but proper, for appellants to present evidence
of the location, character and condition of the property and the highest use for which any and all areas
of the land were suitable, and that, based on such evidence, the jury should determine the value of the
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land as a whole; but it would have been a foolish procedure to hold a separate trial for fixing the value of
each of the six arbitrarily platted areas simply because
one area was, in the sole opinion of Mr. Brayton, suitable for commercial purposes, another or others for
residential purpose and another "of no potential commercial or residential value," but had located on it a
spring as shown on said map.
Whether the trial court might have fixed different boundaries to the two parcels is not important.
After all the purpose was to arriv·e at the market value
of each parcel with all improvements, considering the
highest purpose for which it was adaptable.
Severance Damages

Appellants complain of the court's ruling in
striking from their "Separate Answer" (R. 21) the
following averments:
''4. That by taking from these defendants a part only ·of the two different and separate parcels described above as Area I-D and
IV -B south of Kennedy Drive, damages have
accrued to the portion of said parcels owneq by
these defendants not sought to be condemned
by reason of severance from the portions sought
to be condemned by plaintiff in the sum of
$14,000.00." (R. 39.)
Please note that there is no description of the
land not taken and no allegation as to how or in what
manner it was damage·d by the segregation. (Tillamook County v. Johnson, 190 P. 159.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35

What do appellants claim was severed from what?
They say in the above allegation that plaintiff took
only parts of two parcels they designate as Area I-D
and Area IV-B (see map R. 78).
Area I-D is described in the Answer ( R. 2 9)
as consisting of two parcels, one of which is north
of Kennedy Drive and the other south of the Drive
(both colored in yellow), which latter area, it is
alleged (R. 30), is part of a parcel lying south of
Kennedy Drive owned by appellants.
Area IV-B (see map) consists of one tract of
10.33 acres north of Kennedy Drive and the remainder, 5.43 acres south of Kennedy Drive, which,
it is alleged, is part of another separate and different parcel owned by appellant and not sought to be
condemned, extending south of Kennedy Drive.
The parcels referred to in I-D and IV -B, not
sought to be condemned, are one and the same.
Counsel asserts that by striking the said allegation (par. 4, R. 39) the court eliminated the issue
of damage to the property not taken. Such is not
the fact, for the reason that in the Complaint it is
alleged:
'' 10. That each of the parcels or tracts
sought to be condemned as hereinabove referred
to and set forth is the whole of an enetire parcel or tract of property or interest in or to prop·erty owned b~y the aforesaid defendants., (R.

19.)
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(This was proved by the maps "Ex. A" and
''Ex. 1'' and other evidence.)
This allegation is denied by appelants, and in the
prayer of the Answer (which was not stricken) appellants ask:
''For severance damages to the property owned
by these defendants south of the general area
sought to be condemned, $14,000.00." (R. 41.)
Under this state of the pleadings (respondent
having made prima facie proof that the land was "the
whole of an entire tract") the issue of whether the
tract to be condemned was the whole or merely a
part of appellants' holdings was just as effectively
raised as by the allegation stricken by the court,
which, if it had remained in the Answer, would
have been de·emed denied. The land referred
to, not sought to be taken, is not described.,...
~ in appellants' denial of paragraph 10 of the
complaint, (neither is it described in the stricken paragraphs), but by such denial, whether there was other
land, not taken, was before the court. Appellants had
the burden of proving their damages (Tanner v. Ca ..
nal etc. Co. 40 Utah 105, 121 P. 584; Minneapolis
Dist. v. Fitzpatrick (Minn.) 277 N. W. 394) and
therefore it was their duty, in making proof of damage, to show, if such were the fact, that the property
sought to be condemned was not the whole .of their
property, and theirs was also the obligation, if they
made such proof, to prove their damage, if any, to
-the part of their property not taken. Howeve·r, this
question of severance damage was entirely ignored by
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appellants. They made no proof in support of their
denial, or in response to respondents' affirmative
proof. Appellants assumed throughout the trial that
there was no other land of which the land tp_ken w~
a part, and made no offer of proof e£ ~.:t:T'a~Or'"...,. rJ ~
of damage to any such land.
''Damage to land not taken will not be
presumed, and unless the owner shows by competent evidence that the value of his remaining
land has been diminished by the taking, compensation will be limited to the value of the
land taken." 18 Am. Jur. pp. 985-6, and cases
cited.
As to this final point relied upon by appellants
for reversal, we contend that, like the others, it is without merit.

-CONCLUSION
This case has traveled a rough road. Much time
has been consumed and much expense incurred because
of numerous motions filed by appellants in the court
below, by their application for intermediate appeal,
proceedings for an extraordinary writ and by this
appeal. Following the trial there never was any objection to the amount of the verdict, or to any proceedings by which the amount of compensation was
determined, until the court refused to amend the judgment so as to award interest from July 12, 1951.
In their Application For Payment they asked
for nothing more than to leave open for future litigation the question of such interest, but because their
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claim for interest· was denied (and no court could
properly have done otherwise), they appeal to this
court for a reversal based upon the particular "pointstt
set forth in their Brief and which we have discussed.
But, even here, they really abandon all such points
except the one relating to interest, for in their Brief,
pp. 21-22, they say:

"A New Trial Is Not R'equired
'' Ma thematically, the interest on the fair
market value of the defendants' property between the date of the injury and the time when
the amount of the award was determined can
readily be computed. At six per cent it amounts
to $ 2 4, 7 9 9. 3 2 for the period July 12, 19 51,
until May 10, 19 52.
''This amount the court below could and
should have included in the judgment on the
verdict, no jury question being involved. St.
Louis etc. Ry Co. v. Oliver (Okla.), 87 P. 423,
2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, S 742 _at page
1324.
''This error can be corrected by simple direction of this court, no new trial or resubmission to the jury being required.
"Thus in Reed v. Chicago, Milwaukee ~
St. Paul RR. Co. (C. C.), 25 F. 886, Mr. Justice Shiras said:
" 'Until the verdict is rendered it cannot
be known whether plaintiff tnay be entitled to
interest. When this is determined by the
amount of the verdict, the court can then make
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the proper order, and the same will form part
of the adjudication, settling damages.'
"Accordingly, on appeal the Circuit Court
determined the amount of interest to which plaintiff was entitled, added this to the amount of
the verdict as returned by the jury, and rendered judgment for the aggregate amount.
"Again, the case of Alloway v. Nashville,
88 Tenn. 510, 13 S. W. 123, 8 L.R.A. 123,
was a condemnation proceeding. No instruction as to interest was given or requested and
none was allowed by the jury. Before judgment was rendered, Alloway moved the court
to add interest, as the defendants did here for
the Deere Estate; and there also the motion- was
rejected and on appeal such refusal was assigned
as error. The Supreme Court said:
'' 'Refusal to add interest was error. * * *
Inasmuch as the error can be readily corrected
here, that will be done, instead of reversing and
remanding. This court will render the judgment that should have been rendered below.'
"See also Warren v. St. Paul~ Pacific RR.
Co., 21 Minn. 424, and Whiteacre v. St. Paul
~ Sioux RR. Co., 24 Minn. 311, where the
same practice is approved by the Minnesota Supreme Court; and also 3 Elliott on Railroads,
p. 1457, and 18 Am. Jur., Sec. 277.
"Finally, although the cases and authorities ·
are numerous enunciating the principle, we refer
to the recent opinion of this court in Morris v.
Russell, 236 P. 2d 451, where the same rule
was invoked. References therein were made to
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nois, artd to another recent decision of this court
in Simmons v. Wilkin, 80 Utah 362, 15 P.
2d 321."
Assuming such an attitude, can this court be
expected to consider any assignments of error other
than the one relating to interest? Why bother about
other points if appellants' grievance is really predicated upon the refusal of the court to allow interest?
Is the State to be put to the expense of re-litigating
all the questions covered by the "Points Relied On"
when appellants, in effect, confess that the award of
the jury is quite satisfactory to them if only they can
have interest on it?
We have endeavored to be of assistance. to the
court in the foregoing discussion and can only say in
conclusion that the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER, JR.,
Attorney General.

JESSE R. S. BUDGE,
Special Assistant Attorney General.

Attorneys for Respondent.
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